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Abstract
The  paper  will  dedicate  some  development  to  the  theory  of  the  firm,  that  is:  general 
considerations on organization, capabilities and uncertainty, with particular reference to interactions 
among entrepreneurship, uncertainty and innovation. Particular attention will be paid to the idea of 
radical uncertainty in order to clarify frequent misconceptions as to the meaning and substance of 
this variable, its links with the question of competence and profit and – one of the most abstruse of 
questions – its measurability and the possible implications of deriving such a measure, primarily on 
the management of the business cycle.
The treatment of these subjects will lead into a discussion of the size of the firm, the connected 
organizational  problems  and,  hence,  the  nature  of  the  corporation,  the  question  of  its 
responsibilities, the monitoring role of the profit rate intended as an accountability (not distributive) 
variable, i.e. as an expression of a firm’s results and hence of the success of its decision making and 
some considerations on optimization .
Keywords:  Theories  of  the  firm;  Radical  uncertainty;  Dynamic  competition  process;  The 
question of optimization; Size of the firm; Dimensional boundaries
1. Introduction
This paper considers the problem of the firm in the perspective of general economics much more 
than in that of schools of business administration and organization. In fact, it seems to us that a 
major shortcoming of the good deal of work performed by those schools is the lack of coordination 
with general economics.
     Despite the incessant transformations of the economic background, which produce parallel 
changes in the organization of the firm, some basic features of this preserve substantial stability.  
But  their  meaning  is  obscured  by various  misunderstandings;  some clarification  is  accordingly 
required.
     A main  feature  of  modern  economies  is  the  central  and growing role  that  creativity  and 
innovation  play  in  the  context  of  the  process  of  dynamic  competition.  They  generate  radical 
uncertainty  that  makes  entrepreneurship,  decentralization  and  market  institutions  indispensable, 
being bureaucratic decision making no congenial to radical uncertainty. Therefore, the treatment of 
the firm requires a parallel  discussion of creativity,  innovation and entrepreneurship and a tight 
theoretical interaction amongst them.
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     At present economics is afflicted by a sharp division between a line that presumes perfect 
knowledge, also including known probability distributions, and another emphasizing true or radical 
uncertainty,  that  is,  incomplete  knowledge  and  the  connected  notion  of  bounded  rationality. 
Unfortunately, the second and more realistic line unanimously supposes, as far as we know, that 
radical uncertainty is non-measurable by definition. We shall see that this assumption is wrong, 
both from a theoretical and empirical perspective; it deviates attention from the level of uncertainty 
and its variation; this condemns in a state of theoretical vagueness some important variables, such 
as  entrepreneurship  and  innovation,  as  well  as  decisional  criteria,  and  prevents  a  coherent 
formalization of the dynamic competition process, which is indispensable to encapsulate the theory 
of the firm in general economics.
     It will also shown some way of measuring the degree of radical uncertainty and discussed the 
importance of such measure for the explanation of innovation, investment, the formation and use 
(hence the tension) in entrepreneurial capability and the theory of the firm. Moreover, it will be 
pointed out that the refusal of optimization because it would require the unrealistic hypothesis of 
perfect knowledge is the consequence of the wrong assumption of non measurability of radical 
uncertainty; in the presence of that measure, it is perfectly possible to arrange optimization with 
radical uncertainty and hence to use the consequent approach in decision making.
     It is important to not forget that the firm derives its very nature of entrepreneurial agent from 
uncertainty. On the one side, it causes uncertainty through innovation in a more direct and insistent 
way than other open organizational forms; on the other side, it is obliged to meet uncertainty caused 
by other innovators or exogenous accidents. Profit (usually called extra profit), the main target of 
the firm, is the result of uncertainty,  that is,  of the limitations of knowledge and the connected 
differentials in capabilities. In the absence of exogenous shocks and innovations, the opportunities 
for profit will disappear. 
     In  sum,  in  the  perspective  of  general  economics,  the  firm is  the  engine  of  the  dynamic  
competition process, which characterizes the functioning of modern economies. For that process is 
the result of the entrepreneurial activity of search and discovery of profit opportunities based both 
on innovation and arbitrage over time and space, with the aim to extract gain from the disequilibria 
and darkness characterizing evolutionary processes.
2. Some significant aspects of the debate on the firm.
The perception of the fundamental role that uncertainty and the limitation of knowledge play, has 
progressively entered economics. A number of theoretical approach have grown on this perception, 
and may be unified under the denomination of ‘heterodox economics’.
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     In a seminal contribution of many years ago, E. Penrose reacted to the hypothesis of perfect  
knowledge, which erases entrepreneurial capabilities, through a “Theory of the growth of the firm” 
that is founded upon the availability and evolution of its managerial capabilities and knowledge and 
the ability to diversify production. She says: “Thus the availability of ‘inherited managers’ with 
such experience limits the amount of expansion that can be planned and undertaken in any period of 
time….Once  a  substantial  increment  of  growth is  completed,  however,  the managerial  services 
devoted to it become available for further expansions”1. A shortcoming of this development is the 
omission that such availability depends on the level of uncertainty, which markedly influences both 
the formation of entrepreneurship and the quantity of entrepreneurial knowledge used in ordinary 
activities and to manage the achieved expansion.
     Penrose attributes  great  importance to versatility,  which avoids that  “the market  for those 
products will restrict the firms opportunities of expansion”, and adds: “a versatile title of executive 
service is needed if expansion requires major efforts on the part of the firm to develop new markets 
or entail branching out into new lines of production”.2 The author insists in depicting the firm as an 
administrative and planning organization. She does not consider that this kind of organization is 
mainly typical of bureaucratic-conservative firms. The lack of caution in this matter is an effect of 
the  minor  role  she  attributes  to  uncertainty.  This  one  is  considered  as:  “the  entrepreneur’s 
confidence in his estimates of expectations”, that is, as a subjective and not an objective fact that 
influences the firm’s behaviour. She adds: “Risk, on the other hand, refers to the possible outcomes 
of action, specifically to the loss that may be incurred if a given action is taken”.3 These peculiar 
notions of risk and uncertainty are useful to Penrose’s analytical purposes, but they are deceitful if 
considered in a more general sense. She is concerned about the role of information in reducing 
subjective uncertainty and in the resources necessary to get information, and concludes that risk and 
uncertainty are final limiting factors only if managerial services are fully used. Again, she forgets to 
consider that the use and the need of managerial services depend on the level of uncertainty. This 
level  is  never  considered;  uncertainty  is  simply  treated  as  a  subjective  entity,  rather  than  an 
objective one influencing both demand and supply of entrepreneurship.  A main shortcoming of 
Penrose’s theory of the firm seems to be the marginality of the role she attributes to uncertainty.
     This marginalization of uncertainty persists in all the theories of the firm that attribute a central 
role to capabilities; the reason of that is that the usual way to intend uncertainty makes difficult to 
treat  capabilities.  In  order  to  clarify  this  aspect,  some  considerations  on  the  way  economics 
1  See E. Penrose (1999), p. XII
2  Ibidem, p. 37
3 Ibidem, p 56
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considers uncertainty are required. As is well known, a pioneeristic treatment was provided by F. 
Knight. But his analysis is afflicted by two main errors:
First,  the idea that uncertainty only implies some deviation from the Neoclassical economics of 
perfect knowledge but without substantial prejudice for its teaching.
Second, the idea that uncertainty is non-measurable.
     Heterodox economics  that,  polemically  with mainstream economics  of  perfect  knowledge, 
underlines  the  importance  of  uncertainty,  plainly  overcomes  the  first  Knight’s  error.  But  it 
completely shares the second one.  In addition,  its  right perception of the qualitative jump with 
respect to Neoclassical economics that the introduction of true uncertainty in the analysis implies, 
has strongly accentuated the consequences of the second Knight’s mistake.
     Neoaustrian economics  gives a  clear  expression of some misunderstanding  caused by this 
equivocation. Its sharp criticism against Neoclassical economics is hinged on uncertainty. But the 
assumption of the unmeasurableness and impalpability of uncertainty has imprinted on Neoaustrian 
students a hostility toward organization, leading them to erase the problem of the firm from the 
agenda  of  their  work.  More  precisely,  the  emphasis  on unknown and unintentional  events  has 
pushed their analysis, mainly in Hayek’s version, toward a prejudicial preference for spontaneous 
order over organization and command. These are considered as arbitrary interferences obstructing 
the tendency of social events towards self adjustment. According to this school of thought, general 
rules,  mainly  market  laws,  are  enough to  allow the  harmonization  of  spontaneous  actions  and 
unintentional events.  But their  emphasis on individual initiative ignores the simple fact that the 
limitation of skills requires organization.
     Another  main  obstacle  to  a  neo-Austrian  theory  of  the  firm  is  that  this  school  sees 
entrepreneurial  capability  as  an  evanescent,  non-measurable  entity  and,  as  such,  not  liable  to 
rational  evaluation and impossible  to specify.  But skills  do exist,  and the firm has the duty  to 
evaluate its capabilities with a reliable degree of approximation, so as to use them properly. Neo-
Austrians analysis on market process, uncertainty, search and discovery could provide an important 
contribution to the theory of the firm,  but their  prejudice against  organization has deprived the 
analysis of the firm by those neo-Austrian deepenings.
     J.  A.  Schumpeter  made  an  opposite  error:  his  attention  for  entrepreneurial  capabilities 
disregarded  uncertainty,  notwithstanding  this  one  springs  out  copiously  from  his  ‘creative 
destruction’. This omission, that confirms the difficulty to conjugate capabilities to the usual way to 
consider uncertainty, induced him to emphasize, in “Capitalism, socialism and democracy”, the role 
of managerial services and to predict the end of capitalism as a consequence of bureaucratization. It 
is illuminating on the importance of the consideration of uncertainty the fact that the Schumpeterian 
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theoretical effort gives space, in the end, to bureaucratic aspect at the expense of the entrepreneurial 
one. As a consequence, the building of a general theory of the firm has also been deprived by the 
support of the branch of dynamic competition process represented by creative destruction.
     The effects of these misunderstandings have partially affected evolutionary economics, that has 
accomplished an interesting analysis on the micro-foundations of innovation along Schumpeterian 
lines. Nelson and Winter’s explanatory models of technical change, search and selection within the 
firm have represented an interesting starting point. But an important aspect differentiates this school 
of thought from Schumpeter:  the remark it attributes to uncertainty,  mainly under the notion of 
bounded rationality that however and as we shall see is an ambiguous way to call up incomplete 
knowledge.
    In a  theoretical  context  marked by the notion of bounded rationality,  the difficulty  to treat 
entrepreneurial capabilities appear evident as a consequence of the consideration, in such a context, 
of uncertainty as a non-measurable,  subjective,  impalpable entity.  In point of fact,  evolutionary 
economics  has  performed  some  interesting  researches  on  capabilities  that  stress  the  power  of 
learning and tacit  knowledge for explaining  the behavior,  internal  organization,  boundaries and 
results  of  the  firm.  But  significantly  evolutionary  economics  insists  in  the  identification  of 
capabilities through the notion of decisional routine, as a partial remedy to the analytical vacuity 
deriving from the idea of unmeasurableness and impalpability of uncertainty.  This insistence is 
coherent with the importance that Schumpeter attributed to managerial bureaucracy and also with 
Penrose’s  insistence  on capabilities  separately  from uncertainty.  In  fact,  decisional  routines  are 
concerned with the bureaucratic conservative aspect of organizations. They refer to repetition much 
more than to entrepreneurial decision-making since the last requires versatility and the availability 
of skills able to face uncertainty.
3. An ambivalence in the theory of the firm
It must be underlined that a fundamental ambivalence characterizes evolutionary social thought well 
reflected by evolutionary economics: on one side, this school of thought is inclined to disregard the 
problem of the firm, as a consequence of a tendency to exaggerate the limits in human knowledge 
and hence to distrust of organization at the advantage of spontaneous behaviour; but, for the other 
side, a branch of evolutionary social thought is greatly attracted by the evolution of institutions, not 
only in the sense of Menger’s theory of the emergence of money as a result of unintentional events. 
In economics, this attraction is mainly concerned with the firm; the connected analysis was initially 
fertilized by Coase’s seminal article on “The nature of the firm”. He wrote: “The main reason why 
it  is  profitable  to  establish  a  firm  would  seem  to  be  that  there  is  a  cost  of  using  the  price 
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mechanism…. It is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly 
reduced”.4 Here the firm is represented as an organization that substitutes command for the price 
and market mechanism in the allocation of resources. This Coasian perspective has promoted useful 
investigations  on  the  firm.  Precisely,  it  has  stimulated  two  lines  of  research  directed  towards 
explaining  the  nature  and  the  role  of  the  firm  as  an  organization,  at  present  unified  as  the 
‘contractual perspective’. One line is due to O. Williamson, who developed Coase’s intuition on 
transaction costs and hence emphasized the distinction between “markets and hierarchies”; the other 
line is Alchian and Demsetz’s approach on the “nexus of contracts”.
     Williamson writes: “The two behavioral assumptions on which transaction costs analysis relies –
and without which the study of economic organization is pointless – are bounded rationality and 
opportunism”.5 The  incompleteness  of  contracts  due  to  the  limits  of  human  knowledge,  in 
conjunction  with  assets  specificity  (site,  physical  and  human  specificity)  is  said  to  permit 
opportunism in market contracting, mainly the threat of a unilateral termination of contract that will 
reduce  the  value  of  specific  assets.  This  would  generate  costs  depending  on the  frequency  of 
transactions, uncertainty and the specificity of investment. So the key role of the firm, it is held, is 
reducing those costs by substituting a command mechanism to contracts and the market.
     The consideration of transactions costs, in addition to production expenses, permits significant  
analytical  improvement  on  the  boundaries  of  the  firm  and  its  governance  structure; but  these 
boundaries mainly depend on the availability of capabilities and uncertainty, that limits the degree 
of  understanding  and  hence  the  potential  of  skills.  Therefore,  uncertainty  limits  the  impact  of 
transaction costs in stimulating the size of the firm. In fact, it requires versatility, flexibility and 
promptness that large firm usually lack and that only partly may be stimulated by setting up a 
decentralized  structure.  However,  transaction  costs  are  not  essential  for  explaining  the  firm’s 
existence and nature, which can be referred to some more general consideration on organization, as 
we saw in the previous section.
     Alchian and Demsetz considered contracts from a different point of view. Their work on the firm 
signaled the benefits that input owners may achieve through contractual cooperation and hence the 
need of monitoring of costs. Moreover, they argued that cooperation necessitates of measuring the 
productive contribution of each member of the ‘team’ (to avoid free riding and shirking). They 
accordingly focused on the consequent organizational problems, mainly concerning monitoring and 
incentives. Probably, the most important insight here is the acknowledgment that the monitoring of 
the monitor requires that the overseer has a residual claimant status. Actually,  though, it seems 
inappropriate to treat the firm as a ‘team’ of entrepreneurs-resource owners. The firm is a unitary 
4  See R. H. Coase (1937), p. 390
5  See O. E. Williamson (1981), p. 154
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structure, and its results must refer to that structure as a whole. It is the task of the responsible of the 
firm’s  performance,  who  is  therefore  entitled  to  a  control  power,  to  monitor  the  productive 
contribution of every component of the organization, through incentives or otherwise, in order to 
improve efficiency. But to make accountability effective one needs a precise indicator of the firm’s 
success. As we well know, this indicator can only be the profit rate, as all others are partial  or 
misleading.
     Some insights on the problem of incentives have been provided by the principal-agent approach. 
However,  the  strong  insistence  on  the  crucial  role  of  property  rights,  and  hence  of  private 
ownership6,  as indispensable to the efficient  use of resources and hence to long term economic 
growth, appears misplaced. Monitoring based on the last-claimer principle does not require private 
ownership but only a clear and precise attribution of responsibility for results  (profits).  True in 
small firms, with their serious problems of accountability, efficiency may require private ownership 
with its implicit automatic monitoring, reflecting an immediate interest in economic results. But in 
larger ones efficiency does not require property rights; all that is needed is the clear and inescapable 
attribution of responsibility for the results (in terms of profit  rate),  accompanied by appropriate 
powers of control. This does not necessarily require the ownership of resources.
     In conclusion, contractual approach has provided important results on the internal organization 
of the firm. Besides, it attributes to uncertainty, or incomplete knowledge, an important role, mainly 
through the notions of transaction costs and residual claimant. But the computations it proposes 
express an evident ambiguity as long as uncertainty is considered a non-measurable entity. Another 
most serious limitation of contractarian theories is their disregard for the firm’s competence and 
skills  and,  more  precisely,  the  lack  of  an  interest  in  one key task  of  firms:  searching for  and 
discovering  profit  opportunities,  which  is  the  principal  driving  force  of  innovation  and  hence 
development and growth. On this front the contractual theories, in both the versions sketched out 
here, have made no advance.
     There is now a growing perception among students of the necessity to consider capabilities as a 
key explanatory factor of the firm’s boundaries, behaviour and organization. N. J. Foss and R. N. 
Langlois  have  focused  on  this  aspect.  Against  the  dominant  theory  centered  on  contracts  and 
incentives,  they  contend  that:  “the  capabilities  perspective  is  much  more  conscious  of  the 
production side of the firm and represents the nature of production in a way that is potentially  
complementary to the transaction cost approach”.7 An important characteristic of their approach is 
6  See, for instance, O. Hart and J. Moore (1990). The one-sidedness of this position is well stated by Holmström and  
Roberts, who write: “But this approach also needs to expand its horizon and recognize that power derives from other  
sources than asset ownership and that other incentive instruments than ownership are available to deal with the joint 
problems of motivation and coordination”. See B. Holmström and J. Roberts (1998) p. 92
7  See R. N. Langlois and N. J. Foss (1999), p. 202
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the insistence on the need to integrate the capability and transaction cost perspectives into a unitary 
approach, indispensable to the analytical revitalization of the production costs side. But the main 
flaw is, again, an undervaluation of uncertainty and its  links with capabilities.  Probably,  this is 
mainly due to the supposed non measurability of uncertainty,  implying a theoretical vacuity that 
makes embarrassing the reference to this variable.
     Let insist that, in my own opinion, some main, most paralyzing shortcomings of the current 
theories of the firm are rooted in the way the key notion of uncertainty is considered and used, and 
mainly in the mistaken idea that by definition uncertainty does not admit of quantification but is a  
sort  of  impalpable  entity.  The  consideration  of  the  level  of  uncertainty  and  its  variation  is 
indispensable to may appropriately consider entrepreneurial capabilities and conjugate innovation 
and adaptation (as we saw), hence to the specification of dynamic competition process and, through 
this  one,  the  coordination  of  the  theory  of  the  firm with  general  economics.  The  disregard  in 
principle  of  the  level  of  uncertainty  and  its  variations  precludes  proper  specification  of  the 
formation and use of entrepreneurial capabilities and hence the enunciation of the important notion 
of excess (or tension in the use) of entrepreneurial skills as well as the explanation of innovation 
and investment. 
4. Optimization in the presence of true uncertainty 
The controversy on optimization is important for our topic, in that can help clarify the rather similar 
notions of: bounded rationality, true uncertainty, limits of knowledge and other aspects of heterodox 
economics. As is well known, the success of the notion of bounded rationality is mainly due to its 
help to the criticism to the principle of rational behaviour and optimization. But this critique may 
result misleading. Man is limited by nature; a variety of bounds are always inherent in any kind of 
decision; under this respect, the notion of bounded rationality is little more than a truism. Within the 
boundaries of his knowledge, though, man is obliged,  mainly by competition,  to do his best to 
implement the efficiency of decisions. Man and society need to act rationally; a task of science is to 
stimulate rationality in decision making. The critique of the postulate of rational behaviour, and in 
particular of the optimization principle, does not take this need fully into account.
     Probably the terms ‘uncertainty’ and ‘incomplete knowledge’ would be preferable to ‘bounded 
rationality’.  But  this  terminological  change  does  not  provide  decisive  clarification:  in  fact,  the 
growing hostility  to optimization and some major  impediments  to stringent  formalization of an 
alternative  to  the  Neoclassical  theory  of  the  firm  spring  from  ambiguities  in  the  notion  of 
uncertainty that have precluded, as previously seen, a more satisfactory elaboration on capabilities 
and other theoretical advances. 
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     The exposition of some of the main objections to the optimum principle may illuminate this  
subject.  Kirzner  writes:  “The decision,  in  the  framework of  the human-action  approach,  is  not 
arrived at merely by mechanical computation of the solution to the maximization problem implicit 
in  the configuration  of the given ends and means”.  Later  he adds:  “In other  words,  where the 
circumstances  of  a  decision are believed to  be certainly known to the decision-maker,  we can 
‘predict’  what form that decision will  take merely by identifying the optimum course of action 
relevant  to  the  known circumstances.  Now this  ‘mechanical’  interpretation  of  decision-making 
would be entirely acceptable for a world of perfect knowledge and prediction”.8 
     Kirzner’s reasoning is referable to Neoclassic approach, which excludes uncertainty;  but it 
cannot be generalized. The optimum principle is a mathematical tool that may be applied to various 
theoretical contexts. It is mistaken to presume that it is not applicable in the presence of limited 
knowledge; such a mistake derives from the presumption that uncertainty cannot be measured by 
definition.  But we shall see soon that the distinction of uncertainty from measurable probability 
does not imply the non measurability of the degree of uncertainty. As a consequence of the absence 
of a measure of that degree, various authors have pretended to place uncertainty in the optimization 
approaches in the form of some known distribution of probabilities, which as such do not express 
uncertainty; however, this defect has strengthen the propensity of heterodox economists to refuse 
optimization.
     A different and more cautious critique to the application of the optimization principle has been 
expressed  by  Nelson  and  Winter.  They  write:  “Orthodoxy  treats  the  skilful  behaviour  of  the 
bisinessman as maximizing  choice, and ‘choice’ carries connotation of ‘deliberation’. We, on the 
other hand, emphasize the automaticity of skillful behaviour and the suppression of choice that this 
involves”.  And  later:  “Formal  orthodox  theory,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  rate  solutions  as 
maximizing because they are better than some other observed solutions, but because they are the 
best  feasible  solutions.  It  thus  premises  a  standard  of  performance  that  is  independent  of  the 
characteristics of the performers; the attribution ‘skilled driver’ involves no such premises”.9 This 
critique  does not  express a  radical  refusal  of  optimization  in economics;  simply maintains  that 
decision making is based on tacit knowledge and automaticity instead of deliberate choice. Nelson 
and Winter’s reprimand to Neoclassical pretension to define the best feasible solution ignoring the 
skills of performers is by itself unexceptionable; and it is strongly influenced by the evolutionary 
economics refusal of optimization.
    In our opinion, even though many decisions are based on non-optimizing methods, it is mistaken 
and  excessively  limiting  to  exclude  optimization  as  a  tool  for  improving  decision-making  and 
8  See I. Kirzner (1973), pp. 33 and 35 
9  See R. R. Nelson and S. G. Winter (1982), p. 94
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theoretical formalization. However, the appropriate use of optimization requires a joint specification 
of  the  degree  of  true  uncertainty  and the  associated  entrepreneurial  skill,  as  in  the  absence  of 
uncertainty entrepreneurial skill is inconceivable. Such a specification would allow us to express 
entrepreneurial capabilities and the related notion of incomplete knowledge as the constraints of 
optimization approach, thus removing the bounded rationality criticism to optimization.  This seems 
to be a major challenge for the theory of the firm. But it is crucial, for that specification, to define  
some indicator of the lack of knowledge and to express it in quantitative terms.
     At the end of a review on optimization and evolution, G. Hodgson writes: “Usefully, modern 
evolutionary theory immediately suggests a variety of circumstances in which the validity of the 
maximization  idea  is  under  strain.  Only  further  detailed  theoretical  investigations  can  tell  us 
more.”10 In  this  stage,  it  may be  said  that  the  perceived  strain  is,  for  a  large  part,  a  result  of  
misunderstandings. However, and as far as we know, nobody has pointed out the great importance 
of a measure of the degree of true uncertainty that can be broken down according to firm, sector, 
area, at global level and over time. A central purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the importance, 
both theoretically and empirically,  of such measure.  Among other things, it  would enable us to 
formalize optimization in a realistic non-orthodox way and to represent the natural inclination and 
interest of the firm to choose the best among different opportunities.
      It can be useful to set out a formal example of optimization.  The prominent importance of profit 
both  in  private  and public  firms,  as  an  indicator  of  their  degree  of  success,  suggests  deriving 
investment from profit optimization of firms. This use of optimization intends to underline, among 
other things, that the hostility of limited knowledge and bounded rationality economics towards 
optimization (M. I. Kirzner 1973 and H. A. Simon 1997) is not justified, being simply due to the 
wrong denial of the measurability of uncertainty. Our optimization is intended as follows:
                    ∞    T   
        Max∑j ∫    ∫s=t [ωjεje-ρs-λujsrj(t,s)Ij(t,s)+ω2Ē(t,s)]ds
          (Ut)    t=0 
Ē (the part of entrepreneurial skill depending on the firm’s policy) acts as control variable in the  
above objective function, while  the letter  I stays for gross investment and r for profit rate. The 
integral over the life period of investment ∫Ts=t  [ωjεje-ρs-λujsrj(t,s)Ij(t,s)+ω2Ē(t,s)]ds expresses expected 
profits as discounted by uncertainty indicated buy u (that in this case may consist in a subjective 
evaluation  operated  by  the  firm  plus  an  objective  sectoral  indicator  determined,  for  instance, 
through the elaboration of the answers to a monthly survey of business conditions for a sample of 
firms representative of all industrial sectors and Italian geographical areas by ISAE11; ρ is a nominal 
10  See G. M. Hodgson (1999), p. 195
11  The  late Institute of Studies and Economic Analyses
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interest  rate  and  ε  indicates  the  impact  of  other  factors  influencing  expected  profitability;  ω 
represents weight and j industry. 
     This objective function assumes that the firm distributes its skills and resources among sectors 
with the aim of exploiting at the best the market opportunities of profit. The specification of an 
indicator  of  uncertainty  allows  us  to  overcome  the  present  vacuous  stage  of  the  analysis  of 
entrepreneurial capabilities. More precisely, it permits to make endogenous both the formation and 
use of the firm’s skills, as tightly linked to uncertainty. As is well known, these skills constitute, for 
the major part, a kind of tacit knowledge (in the sense of M. Polanyi), resulting from learning by 
doing, by watching, using, etc.  
     It is not correct to counter that the existence of a measure of the degree of uncertainty would 
imply the possibility of taking out an insurance policy against bad economic results, and hence the 
negation of entrepreneurship. In fact, that measure is not an estimation of risk, giving a probabilistic 
certainty, but just a measure of the lack of knowledge, i.e. of ones distance from a state of complete 
knowledge. On the other hand, uncertainty implies the strong influence of entrepreneurial skills on 
results,  and it  is  impossible  for  insurance  companies  to  measure  those  skills  and  results  from 
outside.  Moreover,  the  insurance  of  entrepreneurial  results  would  stimulate  inconsiderate 
entrepreneurial decision-making, thus increasing insurance costs and jeopardizing entrepreneurial 
role. 
     Many authors have pointed out that firms’ decisions follow much simpler rules than profit  
optimization  (see  the  pioneeristic  study of  R.  M. Cyert  and S.  C.  March,  1963).  M. Polanyi’s  
teaching on tacit knowledge has added some powerful weapons to this argument. Nevertheless, the 
hypothesis  that  the  firm  optimizes  the  distribution  of  its  initiative  among  different  profit 
opportunities seems to express a rigorous and general interpretation of its behaviour, irrespectively 
from the various decisional routines characterizing each firm organization. In fact, it is quite natural 
for the firm to use its limited skills and other resources in such a way to get the maximum benefit,  
even more than a similar attitude is natural in consumer’s spending. In point of fact, consumers that 
do  not  like  worldly  delights  will  disregard  such  maximization;  instead,  the  firm is  obliged  to 
maximize by competition and uncertainty on the potentialities of its  rivals,  otherwise it  will  be 
defeated by optimizing firms.12  
 
12 I agree with Hodgson’s criticism to the idea that evolution implies maximization and to some other aspects of the  
optimization principle, but this author probably would not deny that, for instance, the participants to an examination for, 
say,  a limited number of grants are induced by their ignorance of the worth of rivals to do their best to pass the  
examination.
11
5. On the size of the firm. From individual firms to large scale managerial firms: stimulants 
and boundaries to their dimensional growth       
1.   Now we consider the topic of the size of the firm, which has a great analytical importance 
mainly in regard to the problem of the organizational form of the firm. In this matter, economics 
long accepted Cournot’s solution. But it was then perceived that the hypothesis of the U costs curve, 
on which such a solution is based, cannot be extended to the medium term, to which the problem of 
the  dimension  of  the  firm  refers.  Consequently,  a  number  of  further  hypotheses  have  arisen 
concerning the factors on which depends the size of the firm.
     Some authors, following Kalecki,13 have indicated risk (intended as uncertainty) as a limiting 
factor on the size of the firm, adding that the way to remove this bottleneck to the growth of the  
firm should be represented by ‘inner capital’, that is, self-financing plus shareholders’ saving on 
dividends, which depend on the dimension of profit.
     A careful meditation on the nature of profit shows that such a thesis is internally contradictory.  
Kalecki based his analysis on an aggregate notion of profit deduced from his theory of effective 
demand. However, we know that, for the entrepreneur, uncertainty is an opportunity since it allows 
the deriving of profit from entrepreneurial skills. This means that, in the presence of entrepreneurial 
skills,  uncertainty does not act as a limitation to the firm’s expansion but instead can stimulate 
expansion. With regard to the role of risk, we must also take into account the thesis of Galbraith and 
others,  according  to  which  the  dimensional  increase  of  the  firm and the  connected  productive 
diversification  would  imply  the  reduction  (instead  of  the  increase)  of  risk,  as  a  result  of  the 
tendency to compensation, in the Gaussian sense, of the effects of random events. 
   Another boundary identified as limiting the size of the firm is the width of the market (i.e. of the  
demand) of each good. It was Sraffa who initially underlined this boundary, and related it to the 
growing  sale  expenditures  necessary  to  overcome  it.14 But  it  is  now  well  known  that  the 
diversification  of  production  allows the firm to eliminate  such a  boundary.  Other  authors  have 
emphasized the growing complexity that growth in size of the firm entails for its internal processes 
of  coordination,  control  and  communication.  These  same  authors  (primarily  Kaldor)  have 
underlined  the  limitation  of  the  skills  of  direction,  on  the  hypothesis  that  the  entrepreneurial 
function  is  indivisible  by  definition.  But  the  use  of  computers  allows  an  easy  solution  to  the 
problems of control, coordination and communication. Moreover, Kaldor’s boundary on direction 
makes  sense  only  in  relation  to  the  traditional  notion  of  entrepreneur,  not  to  the  kind  of 
entrepreneurship typical of the large firm. In fact, in this latter case, ability to judge the content and 
implications of the decisions to be taken does not depend on individual skills but rather on the 
13 See M. Kalecky, Entrepreneurial capital and investments (1975).
14  See P. Sraffa (1937).
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quality and quantity of the organizational and managerial resources that the firm has at its disposal. 
This last point is central to the discussion of the size of the firm and hence deserves much attention.
     In  the  modern  large  firm,  the  major  part  of  entrepreneurial  decision-making  is  based  on 
information  owned  by many  people.  J.  K.  Galbraith  wrote:  “The  real  achievement  of  modern 
science  and technology is  represented  by the  possibility  to  take  normal  persons,  educate  them 
accurately  in  a  specific  field  and  hence  coordinate,  through  an  appropriate  organization,  their 
competence with those of other specialized ordinary people.”15 This makes possible to meet the 
exigencies generated by technological development and reach decisions on very complex questions 
by using skills that are easy to find and instruct; with the only condition that the people endowed 
with the required knowledge are able to collaborate and express collective decisions. So, in the 
modern large firm, the entrepreneurial function is not unique and indivisible (as Kaldor supposed), 
but is expressed by a plurality of levels that vary according to the decisions taken over the course of 
time,  since only he who possesses the requisite knowledge can be charged with decision.  As a 
consequence, the limitation of the size of the firm cannot come from this side, at least not if there is  
the will and ability to make the qualitative jump from traditional to managerial organization. This 
has been clarified in the managerial literature that takes its origin from the work of E. Penrose.16
 2.  If the reason why the firm exists is correctly treated, the true limit on the growth of its size 
becomes evident. For the reason for the existence of the firm also contains the boundary on its 
growth; this reason being the necessity of committing economic and productive decisions to the 
competence  and  the  knowledge  of  people  in  close  contact  with  the  changing  events  to  which 
decisions refer. Such a necessity conflicts, not only with centralization tout court, but also with an 
unlimited enlargement of the size of the firm, whatever its organizational form. The boundary on 
size resulting from the above need of decentralization can only be shifted,  through appropriate 
organizational forms; it cannot be eliminated. This topic deserves attention.
     We have seen in the previous paragraph that an efficacious use of knowledge, in the presence of 
increasing technological complexity,  often suggests and sometimes imposes the widening of the 
entrepreneurial function by entrusting managerial groups with it. Well, such an organizational form  
implies  a remarkable increase of  the minimal size of the firm; besides,  it  makes  it  possible  to  
considerably increase dimension without this entailing a considerable centralization of decision-
making.  The  multidivisional  organization  provides  further  degrees  of  freedom  in  conjugating 
decentralization with large size, thus further amplifying the dimensional boundary. It follows that a 
real problem is the verification of the possibility of amplification of such a boundary through the 
15  See J. K. Galbraith  (1968) pp. 55-56.
16 See E. T. Penrose (1995)
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adoption of a managerial organization. Such verification might start by considering the managerial 
organization  that  implies  the  maximum  degree  of  internal  decentralization,  that  is,  group 
organization (but we can also refer to a unitary juridical form of multidivisional type). As is well 
known,  at  the top of  the  group we find a  holding that  controls  the various  operational  unities 
constituting the group. Two cases can be differentiated:
a) The board of directors driving each unity enjoys  full administrative autonomy, while the 
holding  limits  itself  to  the  perception  of  profits.  In  this  case,  the  group  cannot  be 
considered a single firm; it is a group of firms. In fact, the definition of the firm is based 
on the notion of ‘autonomous’  decision-making,  while such a definition does not give 
importance to the problem of the attribution of profits.
b) The  holding  has  a  unitary  executive  committee  that  resolves  the  conflicts  among  the 
various  sub-groups,  bringing them back into  the  orbit  of  the  general  strategies  of  the 
group. In this case the group is a single firm, due to the subordination of each operational 
unity to the decisional powers that the holding exercises.17
 Only the second case (b) is of interest for our analysis of the space that the managerial organization 
of group (or multidivisional organization) offers to the amplification of the size of the firm. Such an 
analysis  is  facilitated  by  the  fact  that  the  field  of  decision-making  committed  to  the  holding 
competence is usually very large, including within it all strategic choices.
     Usually,  the great  multinational  and multidivisional  firms  entitle  the parent  society to  the 
financial  management,  technological  research  and  formative  services,  while  the  branch  offices 
administer choices of tactical character and must supply to the parent society periodical reports, 
must  analyze  the results  achieved in collegial  meetings  of the group,  and are submitted  to  the 
control visits of central  inspectors.18 This notwithstanding the fact that the large multidivisional 
firms are in general the group organizations most decentralized and articulated.
     It is immediately evident that the links of subordination of each operative unity to the holding 
described above remove decisional power on crucial questions from people operating on the spot. 
Such negative effects of this centralization of decision-making grow with the dimensions of the 
group and the number of operative unities controlled by the holding and productive diversification, 
and can be reduced only through a reduction of the decision power of the central board and top 
17 It is extremely difficult to give an empirical content to the distinctions between (a) and (b). Case (a) has an eminently 
theoretical character; while case (b) represents, with various degrees, the prevailing situation.
18 Often a deeper internal decentralization corresponds to the initial phase of the international expansion of the firm; but  
in the phase that follows a consolidation of the authority of the mother society will be practiced. In fact, the collection  
of financing and the use of resources are planned by the central power and the use of corporate planning is extended and 
strengthened,  which implies the reinforcement  of the interdependence  among the various productive,  financial  and  
commercial administrations in the context of the global control and development strategy elaborated by the staff of the  
multinational firm according to a unitary logic. The adoption of refined methods to condition and train the directors 
warrants their behavioral uniformity, thus making easy the coordination of the activity of associated firms. 
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management; but such a reduction attenuates the characterization of the group as a unitary firm, 
ultimately tending to the complete suppression of such a character and the reduction of the parent 
society to the first case described above (a).
     It must be added that the operation of a unitary group strategy does not cause only decisional 
inefficiency,  it also causes organizational inefficiency.  Let us briefly explore the reason for this 
inconvenience.  It  is  well  known  that,  in  the  holding  situation  described  in  (b),  the  types  of 
investment are decided by the central direction of each society. This deprives such societies of an 
important component of their autonomy and generates enormous difficulties in defining the criteria 
of evaluation of the results achieved by them and, hence, a sharp-sighted subdivision among them 
of the capital to be invested. In fact, the natural parameter for such evaluation, the profit rate of the 
firm, becomes useless since: (a) profit is conditioned in a decisive way by the general strategy of the 
group, which is defined outside the operative unities; (b) it is very difficult to define, with regard to  
the considered group, the firm’s profits, both due to the arbitrariness of the attribution to each unity 
(or  division)  of  the  general  costs  concerning  centralized  services,  and  the  arbitrariness  of  the 
definition of unity prices of the goods exchanged inside the group (or inside the multidivisional 
firm).
     We can see, therefore,  that the groups of firms (or the big multidivisional firm) encounter  
problems of decisional and organizational efficiency identical to those that, on a larger scale, are 
typical of centralized economies. This is not casual. In fact, we have seen that an enormous growth 
of dimensions determines administrative structures more similar to centralized than decentralized 
economic orders and also implies a substantial undermining of the main reasons for both the firm 
and decentralization.
3. It is surprising that the drawbacks caused in big firms by the need  for the centralization of  
strategic  decision-making described above  have  been disregarded by  important  students  of  
managerial organization. E. Penrose wrote: “we have rejected the proposition that there is for 
every firm some  optimum size beyond which it  will  run into diseconomies.  Only for firms 
incapable of adapting their managerial structure to the requirements of larger operations can one 
postulate an optimum”19 
     According to Penrose, the adjustment of staff would allow, among other things, an increase and 
improvement in the quantity of available information and, hence, the skill to make decisions. But 
the adjustment of the staff is unable to solve either the organizational problem considered above or 
to eliminate the negative implications for the efficiency of decision-making that, in the presence of 
19 See E. Penrose (1995) page 98.
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very large dimensions, are caused by the centralization of strategic decisions. The great distance, in 
the case of large dimensions, between he who takes decisions and everyday events inevitably causes 
some substantial extraneousness with respect to the specificity of events.
     Some pages later, Penrose says: “In spite of the opportunities and pressures which lead firms 
into the production of a wider range of products, it seems likely that most firms still derive the bulk 
of  their  income from a relatively  few closely related  products.”.20 Well,  this  circumstance  that 
Penrose rightly underlines must be primarily attributed to the fact that the losses in decisional and 
organizational efficiency due to the centralization of strategic decision-making are modest if goods 
are not numerous and, therefore, the decisions concerning them have many affinities. While a firm 
is expanding, its organization must change. But, until certain dimensional levels (which vary in 
each case), and if the output of the firm is less diversified, these changes cause neither inefficiencies 
due to centralization nor substantial qualitative jumps. Some new directional powers are created, 
but the entrepreneurial function does not suffer dispersion.
     The situation  becomes  more  complicated  if  dimensions  continue  to  grow. In this  case,  it  
becomes necessary to establish some sublevel  of entrepreneurship.  But these sublevels  must  be 
coordinated according to a unitary logic.  As a consequence,  a conflict  inside the organizational 
managerial  logics  takes  place;  the  inevitable  interference  of  the  top  management  within  the 
decisional role belonging to the new sublevels of entrepreneurship causes a loss of entrepreneurial 
efficiency. The situation is worsened by the fact that, beyond some dimensions, a further expansion 
of the firm requires an increase in productive diversification; but such greater diversification raises 
the necessity of coordination, thus determining a further limitation on the possibility of decisional 
decentralization and, hence, further reducing the knowledge of problems on the part  of he who 
decides.
     On the  other  hand,  the  dispersion  of  entrepreneurship  throughout  a  variety  of  decisional 
sublevels (that operate notwithstanding the centralization of strategic decision-making considered 
above), is not without its inconveniencies. In particular, by determining a multiplicity of subjective 
points of view that decision making is obliged to confront, such dispersion causes limitations in 
both the agility of decision-making and the versatility of entrepreneurial imagination. For sure, the 
above decisional technique is characterized by a greater accuracy, reflexivity and “propensity to 
prepare the ground” than is the traditional entrepreneurship. But this represents an advantage only if 
the  firm  encounters  an  external  environment  that  is  easy  to  dominate  and  foresee.  In  sum, 
managerial organization, being well endowed with reflexivity and the power of persuasion, is more 
qualified to shape and influence the external world than to suffer its influence and adapt itself to it. 
20 See E. Penrose (1995), page 150
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It  encounters  difficulties  if  it  needs  to  adapt  itself  more  than  it  needs  to  adapt  others  to  its  
exigencies,  that  is,  if  the  boundaries  deriving  from  the  external  environment  are  strong  and  
persistent. The theorists of the giant firm have dedicated inadequate attention to the role of external 
boundaries. They were living in a world in which the managerial firm seemed able to subsume all 
by its logic; and so they judged reality and theorized this process while comfortably sitting in the 
large stomach of the big firm. Consequently, their view is limited and one-sided. In the life of the  
firm with a higher incidence of external  than internal boundaries,  there corresponds a greater  
necessity to decentralize decision-making; as a consequence, the obstacles that obstruct the growth  
of the firm rise.
     From the above considerations derives, among other things, an important explanation of the 
reason of  the existence  of the small  firm,  in addition to  those set  out  by the interstitial  theory 
(Penrose, Sylos Labini) and by the theory that underlines the importance of the innovative role of 
the little firm (G. Berardi). The space available to the small and medium-sized firm seems due to a 
more  general  reason  than  those  considered  by  these  authors:  these  firms  are,  first  of  all,  an 
expression of the physiological exigency of decentralization that we have underlined. This implies 
that their presence should be more frequent in the sectors where the necessity to decide on the spot  
is  higher,  since those sectors do not like the centralization of strategic  decision-making,  which 
instead is typical of diversified large firms.
6. Some details on the factors counteracting the boundaries on the dimensions: their objective 
or institutional nature
We discussed, hitherto, the boundaries on the dimensions of the firm and underlined that they are 
much larger in managerial than traditional firms. But we have not discussed the dimension that the 
firm can concretely reach before the boundaries here considered become active. Now we come to 
do this.
     The size of the firm depends on the force of the factors that counteract the above boundaries, 
thus promoting the enlargement of the firm. These factors are: (a) scale economies of technical, 
financial and managerial-organizational character; (b) growth economies. As is well known, these 
economies are numerous and variegated. The problem is to see how far they are able to overcome 
opposition to the reduction of size deriving from the inefficiency in decision-making caused by 
centralization,  and  when  the  contrary  occurs.  Such  verification  can  be  performed  only  with 
reference to concrete cases. However, some general considerations can be stated. 
     The size of scale and growth economies is frequently so large as to justify the conclusion that 
large dimensions are obstructed for the most part by the qualitative jump in organization that they  
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need, much more so than by the boundaries we are discussing. Nevertheless, critical students will 
perceive that the theoretical relevance of such a boundary is great. Let us see. If we consider the  
problem from the point of view of a general theory of decentralization, i.e. abstracting from specific 
institutional forms, we must ask ourselves what part of both scale and growth economies derives 
from the institutional content of the existing forms of decentralization, and what part has instead an 
objective character , this intended in the sense that it abstracts from the existing institutional forms. 
This  consideration  allows  understanding  that  the  boundary  to  the  size  of  the  firm  previously 
underlined has a character much more restrictive and relevant (from an analytical point of view) 
than appears at first sight. This point deserves further consideration.
     Without any doubt, the push on the growth of size is largely due to financial factors, especially if 
the growth takes a conglomerate form. This happens because the organization of the group causes 
an increase (both through financial  conjunctions and the multiplication of the levels  of vertical 
participation) of the quantity of risk capital (present in the patrimonial estate of each firm of the 
group) far beyond the effective amount of capital, thus favoring both the preservation of control 
positions and the collection of funds in the market. But these advantages operate only if the market  
for capital and the financing of the firm are organized in a capitalist way.
     The same can be said with regard to the economies of dimension dependent on the activity of 
R&D. These economies may exist only if R&D operates inside the firm. But we can suppose a 
decentralized economic system where such activity is largely performed outside the firm, through 
appropriate institutions, and where the firm only decides which of the scientific results achieved by 
those research institutions to utilize, as well as when and the way in which to utilize them. 21 Also 
market  research,  engineering,  computation  and  information,  as  well  as  the  assistance  services 
needed by firms operating abroad, could be supplied, at the request of users, by specialized centers. 
For  their  part,  scale  economies  concerning advertisement  expenditures  represent  in  the  main  a 
peculiarity of capitalist decentralization. The same is valid with regard to the dimensional growth 
hastened by reasons of prestige; in fact, it is possible to create a system of financing of production 
able to exclude those reasons from the leading criteria of distribution, among firms, of the national 
fund of investment.
     Indeed, only a modest number of scale economies have an  objective character, that is,  are 
independent  of  the considered institutional  system.  Among them are those that  arise due to the 
possibility of using, with the growth of production, superior techniques and/or from using more 
rationally the existing installations by specializing the phases of production. Furthermore, there are 
21 Something analogous is witnessed by the fact that a lot of innovations have been produced by small and medium-
sized  firms,  while  only  excessively  large  firms,  well  endowed  with  financial  capital  and  an  efficient  commercial  
organization, intervene to give full value to these innovations.
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economies  that  arise  from  the  fact  that  purchase  costs,  and  the  cost  of  the  functioning  of 
installations are less than proportional to their dimension. Finally, there are economies determined 
by the possibility of introducing, in case of larger dimensions, less expensive control systems, and 
the possibility of reducing the unsold stocks (as an effect of the Gaussian law of larger numbers).
     Further incentives to the growth of size of an objective character may depend on the tendency to 
consolidate,  through  entrance  into  a  secondary  market,  the  position  in  the  main  market  of 
production;  moreover,  these  incentives  can  derive  from the  reduction  of  the  degree  of  radical 
uncertainty that growth allows as an effect of the connected higher control of markets and major 
productive diversification. For their part, growth economies that are not scale economies22 stimulate 
indefinitely  the  dimension  of  the  firm  only  if  unit  costs  in  the  medium  and  long  run  remain 
constant; they do not do so if those costs start to rise sooner or later, due to the presence of the  
boundary here discussed.
     On the whole, the dimension of the scale and growth economies with objective character (and 
that  are,  as  such,  unavoidable)  does  not  seem  to  explain  the  conglomerations  and  industrial 
gigantism that we observe.  After  all,  these economies  rarely operate  together  so as to generate 
strong counter tendencies with respect to the dimensional boundary deriving from the centralization 
of the entrepreneur’s decision-making accompanying gigantism.
     The analysis developed in this section shows the erroneousness of Galbraith’s prediction23 of a 
continuous expansion, in modern societies, of economic planning to the detriment of the market, 
consequent  on  the  continuous  growth  of  the  dimensions  of  the  firm.  This  means  also  that 
Galbraith’s derivative prediction of the tendency of capitalism and socialism to converge towards 
social planning is groundless.
     Our analysis also shows that in current decentralized economic systems the firm as an institution 
achieves a rationalization of productive processes far below its potential; this being a consequence 
of the fact that gigantism proliferates well beyond objective necessities. Of course, large dimensions 
have  (and  always  will  have)  an  important  role  –  sometimes  even  in  stimulating  ‘dynamic 
competition’ – both through their activity in the international market and also because they imply a 
reduction of market imperfections due to lack of information and the possible presence of a large 
number of separate little firms. But it does not appear that the existence and imperialism of giant 
firms is justified by objective reasons. Immanent and unrestrainable tendencies towards growing 
industrial and productive concentration do not exist.
22 That is, the economies deriving from existing non utilization of managerial resources (the services of which cannot be 
sold in the market) that E. Penrose has emphasized. These economies may cease with the end of the expansion that  
generated them; therefore, they do not imply economies of dimension. 
23 See J. K. Galbraith (1968).
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Conclusion
It is our belief that a major deepening of the coordination between the theory of the firm and general 
economics is indispensable to make heterodox economics more attractive. In fact, a main reason of 
the survival of the Neoclassic theory of the firm and its large number of followers (notwithstanding 
its inability to consider some crucial aspects of the economy such as innovation, entrepreneurship 
and uncertainty) is its perfect coordination with general economics. 
     The current idea of true (or radical) uncertainty as a non-measurable entity represents a main  
obstacle  to  the  coordination  of  the  heterodox  theories  of  the  firm  with  general  economics,  a 
coordination  that,  in  fact,  requires  a  specification  of  the  notion  of  dynamic  competition as 
representing economic process with entrepreneurship, innovation and radical uncertainty.
     This paper has presented a formulation on the firm showing some difference, with respect to 
usual  formulations,  on  the  explanation  of  capital  accumulation,  the  role  of  the  profit  rate  and 
technical  progress.  In  particular,  it  points  out  the  close  relation  between  entrepreneurship, 
innovation, uncertainty, their crucial influence on growth and development, and the importance of a 
measure of the degree of radical uncertainty, which allows a representation of dynamic competition 
process and its cyclical behaviour.
     Our developments have much to do with the organizational aspect. In particular, the two final 
sections  on the dimension of  the  firm lead to  consider  important  organizational  forms  and the 
relative  problems,  mainly  with  regard  to  holdings:  organization  of  group,  managerial  and 
multidivisional forms, centralization versus decentralization.
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